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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Respondent
vs.
Case No. 19774

JOHN ORIN WULFFENSTEIN,
Defendant/Appellant/
Petitioner

PETITION FOR REHEARING
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is a petition for rehearing of a per curiam opinion,
State v. Wulffenstein, 27 Utah Adv. Rep. 32 (Utah 1986), filed by
this Court on February 6, 1986.

Originally, this case was an

appeal from a conviction and judgment of Aggravated Robbery, a
felony of the First Degree, against John Orin Wulffenstein in
the Second District Court, in and for Weber County, State of Utah,
the Honorable Calvin Gould, Judge, presiding.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The facts are set forth in the Brief of Appellant
(Appellant's Brief at 1-5).
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE APPELLANT WAS NOT REPRESENTED BY
AN ATTORNEY AT TWO CRITICAL STAGES
OF THE PROCEEDINGS AGAINST HIM AND
DID NOT WAIVE HIS RIGHT TO AN
ATTORNEY.
!n its per curiam opinion, State v. Wulffenstein, 27 Utah

Adv. Rep. 32 (1986), this Court has either misapprehended or
overlooked

a

primary contention advanced by Appellant.

The opinion correctly notes that Mr. Wulffenstein was
not represented by an attorney at either the preliminary hearing
in the circuit court or the arraignment in the district court*
Id. at 33.

Further, the opinion correctly states that Mr.

Wulffenstenin was unrepresented at these proceedings because he
had refused to be represented by the public defender's office.
The opinion then rejects Appellant's contention that he should
have been allowed to dismiss the court-appointed attorney and have
another attorney appointed.

However, the opinion next states,

"The lower court properly advised defendant that his unjustified
conclusory rejection of counsel would be deemed a waiver of the
right to a court-appointed attorney."

Id., at 33.

In fact, no such mention of waiver of the right to counsel
can be found in either the circuit court preliminary hearing transcript (R.302-370) or the district court arraignment transcript
(R.371-392).

The closest that either court came to advising the

defendant that his rejection of the public defender would be "deemed
a waiver of the right to a court-appointed attorney" was a statement
by the district court judge that:
I'm willing to hear your reasons,
if any, for refusing this office
[the public defender]. Should you
refuse this office for good reason,
we will appoint someone else. If
there is no good reason, then you
will have to go alone without
counsel. (R.375)
-2-

This statement, however, falls far short of the advice required
concerning waiver.
Several cases have discussed waiver of the right to
counsel and from these cases, it is possible to define the parameters of a constitutionally acceptable waiver.
is a requirement in right to counsel cases.

A finding of waiver

The necessity of a

finding that such a waiver has been made was decreed in Johnson v.
Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938).

Besides requiring that a waiver to

right to counsel be "knowingly and intelligently" made, the Court
in that case stated:
It has been pointed out that
"courts indulge every reasonable
presumption against waiver" of
fundamental constitutional rights
and that we "do not presume acquiscence in the loss of fundamental
rights." . . . The constitutional
right of an accused to be represened by counsel invokes, of itself,
the protection of a trial court, in
which the accused—whose life or
liberty is at stake—is without
counsel. This protecting duty
imposes the serious and weighty
responsibility upon the trial judge
of determining whether there is an
intelligent and competent waiver
by the accused. While an accused may
waive the right to counsel, whether
there is a proper waiver should be
clearly determined by the trial court,
and it would be fitting and appropriate for that determination to appear
upon the record. Id. at 464, 465
(emphasis added).
In extending this protection to state criminal matters the Court
in Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506 (1962) stated that the evidence
-3-

must show that the defendant was informed specifically of his
right to the assistance of appointed or retained counsel and that
he clearly rejected such assistance.

No amount of circumstantial

evidence that the person may have been aware of his right to
counsel and intended to relinquish it will suffice.

Miranda v.

Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 471-2 (1966).
Further, an adequate waiver of right to counsel which
results in an accused representing himself has additional requirements.

In those cases, the defendant "should be made aware of

the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation, so that the
record will establish that 'he knows what he is doing and his
choice is made with eyes open. 1 "

Faretta v. California, 422 U.S.

806, 835 (1975).
Finally, in Carnley v. Cochran, the Court stated:
"Presuming waiver from a silent record is impermissible.

The

record must show, or there must be an allegation and evidence which
show, that an accused was offered counsel but intelligently and
understandingly rejected the offer.
369 U.S. at 516.

Anything less is not waiver."

The Utah Supreme Court has adopted the position

that waiver will not be presumed from a silent record when important
constitutional rights are at stake.

Chess v. Smith, 617 P.2d 341

at 345 (Utah 1980) and State v. Cook, 26 Utah Adv. Rep. 21 at 22
(1986) .
To summarize, an adequate waiver of right to counsel
requires that the waiver be knowingly and intelligently made
on the record.

An adequate waiver can only occur after a defendant
-4-

has been informed of his right to counsel and has been advised of
the dangers and pitfalls of self-representation.

Finally, waiver

will not be presumed from a silent or inadequate record and every
reasonable presumption against waiver must be indulged.
Measured against this yardstick, the waiver in the
present case was woefully inadequate.

Neither the circuit court

nor the district court investigated the concerns voiced by Mr.
Wulffenstein about the public defender'.s off ice.

Both courts

seemed to proceed as if a waiver of right to counsel had been
made by the Appellant, yet there is nothing in the record to show
that the right was properly waived,if waived at all.

In fact,

near the conclusion of the district court arraignment, Mr. Wulffenstein specifically stated:

"[I] would like to put on there [the

record] that I have not waived any right to an attorney. .
(R.387).

."

No judge in any proceeding held in this case made a finding

on the record to the contrary.
POINT II
THE INTRODUCTION INTO EVIDENCE OF
MISCELLANEOUS DRUGS WAS HIGHLY
PREJUDICIAL AND OF NO PROBATIVE
VALUE.
At trial, some bags containing loose drugs found in the
possession of Mr. Wulffenstein at the time of his arrest were used
by the prosecutor in questioning the pharmacist who was working
at the time of the robbery (R.100-103).
pills and capsules were introduced
and D.

The bags of miscellaneous

and received as exhibits A,C,

Mr. Wulffenstein objected to the use of the drugs at trial
-5-

(R.103-04,221-22) and presented a claim of error concerning the
drugs on appeal (Appellant's Brief at 10-14 and Appellantfs
Brief at 7-11).

This claim was rejected.

State v. Wulffenstein,

27 Utah Adv. Rep. 32 at 33-4 (1986).
The per curiam opinion in this case stated:

"The

fact that every pill could not be positively identified as having
come from the pharmacy does not make the evidence inadmissible."
Id. at 34. This statement is erroneous since, in fact, not one
of the pills or capsules could be positively identified as having
come from the pharmacy (R.103-04).

The trial judge in the case,

agreeing with a defense objection, restricted the prosecution's
use of the loose drugs to illustrate the type of pills taken in
the robbery.

(R.104).

The opinion then engages in speculation concerning the
probative nature of such evidence stating:
Although circumstantial in nature,
this evidence was certainly probative
of defendant's guilt and was properly
presented for the jury's consideration,
even though possibly indicative of
other misdeeds by defendant. Connection
between the exhibits, the defendant,
and the crime may be shown by the circumstantial nature of the evidence.
The drugs were admissible to show the
background and circumstances of
defendant's involvement, particularly
in light of the positive identification
by the victims.
Id. at 34 (citations omitted).

In fact, although the exact basis

on which the drugs were admitted is uncertain, the prosecution

-6-

sought admission solely for the fact that they were found on Mr.
Wulffenstein (R.221-22).

Since there was no way to tie any of

these specific drugs to the robbery, the only possible purpose
to be served by the admission of the drugs would be to present
an image to the jury of the Appellant as a drug abuser and a menace
to society.

Thus, no legitimate purpose was served by the intro-

duction of the unidentifiable loose narcotics and the only result
was to prejudice the Appellant. (Appellant's Brief at 10-14.)
CONCLUSION
Because the per curiam opinion in this case overlooked
Appellant's contention that he did not waive his right to counsel
and because the opinion misapprehended the limited use and prejudicial

effect of the introduction at trial of exhibits A,C, and

D, the Appellant respectfully petitions this Court to reconsider
its decision and reverse his conviction and remand the case for
a new trial or dismissal of the charges against him.
Respectfully submitted this

day of February, 1986.

CURTIS C. NESSET
Attorney for Petitioner

I hereby certify that I delivered four copies of the
foregoing to the Attorney General's Office, 236 State Capitol
Building, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114, this

day of

February, 1986.

CURTIS C. NESSET
Attorney for Petitioner
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this case and;
(2)
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Court in good faith and not to delay any matter in this case.
Respectfully submitted this

day of February,
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CURTIS C. NESSET
Attorney for Appellant/Petitioner
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